

**Does it Pay for Firms to Be Progressive? The Effect of Corporate
Sociopolitical Activism on Consumers' Buycott and Boycott Responses**

Maria D. Perez
University of Southern California
mdperez@usc.edu

2022

ABSTRACT

I argue that the forms of actions undertaken by firms to demonstrate their corporate sociopolitical activism (CSA) critically shape consumers' *boycotting* and *buycotting* behavior: Consumers are more likely to *boycott* ideologically misaligned firms that assume a pioneering role in promoting CSA than a follower role; they are more likely to *buycott* ideologically aligned firms that engage in substantive actions, rather than symbolic actions. However, firms' pioneer versus follower roles do not affect their likelihood of being buycotted by ideologically aligned consumers, nor do firms' substantive versus symbolic actions affect their likelihood of being buycotted by ideologically aligned consumers. I implement a survey experiment on a large, nationally representative pool of United State citizens. This study informs firms of appropriate strategies of engaging in CSA.

1. Introduction

Corporate sociopolitical activism (CSA) is as a novel but highly salient and increasingly important phenomenon where private companies demonstrate their sociopolitical values by taking a stand on sociopolitical issues that are not directly related to their core business activities (Briscoe and Gupta 2016; Chatterji and Toffel 2018; Burbano 2021). These issues, such as gun control, abortion, and the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTBQ) populations, are commonly polarizing. As a result, firms' engagement in CSA frequently triggers evaluative biases in consumers, which can result in a change of consumer behavior such as avoiding purchase (boycotting) and seeking out of purchase (buycotting) of the firm's products (Kam and Deichert 2020). Boycotting and buycotting can significantly affect firms' performance. For example, Nike's sales increased by 38% after its 2018 advertising campaign featuring quarterback Colin Kaepernick, known for protesting against racial inequality. Conversely, after Target announced its gender-neutral restrooms policy in 2016, its overall sales fell 7.2% in its second quarter. As a result, it is critical for firms to understand how consumers boycott or buycott products in response to firms' CSA strategy, in order to more accurately estimate whether and how much firms will be rewarded or punished for engaging in a certain CSA strategy.

However, the extant literatures shed limited light on consumers' response to different forms of CSA strategies. The strategy literature has examined CSA's general effect on consumers' inclination to purchase but does not differentiate the effect of different CSA strategies; current studies have also examined customers' stated intent to purchase without testing their actual behavior (Chatterji and Toffel 2016, 2017; Dodd and Supa, 2014). The literature of political consumerism demonstrates that consumers tend to like (dislike) a brand whose demonstrated political position is aligned (misaligned) with their own (Friedman 1996; Neilson 2010; Sen et al. 2001; Klein et al. 2004) but they do not demonstrate the critical conditions that change these

relationships, nor do they examine consumers' decision to boycott/boycott through economic stakes. Thus, both literatures remain silent on how different forms of CSA engagement shape consumer responses.

The goal of this paper is to fill this gap by demonstrating that firm's own actions undertaken to engage in CSA affect consumers' responses to CSA. Addressing this question helps inform firms of the appropriate strategies to adopt when publicly engaging with sociopolitical issues. I draw on existing theoretical explanations on how consumers respond to firms' behaviors towards corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activities (CPA), given CSA is seen as a nonmarket strategy that falls in between both of these (Burbano, 2021), to generate a novel theoretical framework. In doing this, I integrate the theory of political consumerism hypothesis with the screening and neo-institutionalist theories (Bergh et al. 2014; Connelly et al. 2011; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Klein et al. 2004). I argue that, as CSA engagement communicates the firm's sociopolitical values (Bhagwat et al. 2020), consumers will screen the firm's behavior in search for cues to motivate a political consumerism response. First, that a firm assumes a pioneer instead of follower role in promoting a CSA stance provides information for consumers to infer that the firm is more likely to exercise its own agency in advocating a stance that deviates from that of the customers, thus further increasing the likelihood of boycotting. Second, that a firm undertakes substantive instead of symbolic actions increase consumers' assessment that the firm's action generates greater tangible impact on the sociopolitical cause, thus further increasing the likelihood of boycotting. Finally, these effects are not symmetric. Building on the insights developed political consumerism literature that it is easier to trigger boycotting than buycotting, I argue that buycotting does not differ in response to pioneer vs follower roles whereas boycotting does not differ based on substantive vs symbolic actions.

To empirically examine my theory, I implement a survey experiment through a panel of 5,106 participants from the online marketplace Prolific. I manipulated several sociopolitical issues (including the right to access abortion, stricter gun control regulations, and transgender-inclusive restroom policies) and the information about whether a firm took a progressive stance on that issue through CSA. In terms of the forms of CSA, I vary the synopsis of whether the firm pioneered the undertaking of a progressive stance on a particular issue or followed the collective of companies in taking the stance, and if the commitment to the cause was made by simply making a public statement which is considered symbolic, or writing letters to legislators advocating for the cause which is more substantive.

This paper makes several contribution to the strategy literature. First, I extend the insights on the impact that CSA has on consumers' choices and behavior, as current research mostly looked at self-reported intent to purchase (Chatterji and Toffel 2016, 2017; Dodd and Supa, 2014) or has focused on other firms' stakeholders, such as on employees' motivation to work (Burbano 2018, 2020, 2021) or investors' decision to invest (Bhagwat et al. 2020). [highlight the novelty of your survey methods] Second, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to test consumers' reaction to different forms of CSA engagement, therefore addressing a clear research gap regarding critical factors that moderate boycotting and buycotting responses. Third, the findings carry strong strategic implications for firms seeking to engage in CSA in order to maximize consumer reward while reducing its backlash. Lastly, this paper also contributes to the political consumerism literature, as it is one of the few studies that simultaneously tests for boycotting and buycotting responses from consumers, therefore further highlighting asymmetry of these two forms of political consumerism (Panagopoulos et al 2019).

The paper proceeds as follows. The first section provides a theoretical basis of political consumerism, to generate baseline hypotheses that CSA affects both buycotting and boycotting.

The theory section develops the core hypotheses of how firms' pioneer versus follower roles and substantive versus symbolic actions in CSA send varying signals to shape consumers' boycotting and boycotting responses in different ways. The following section outlines the experimental design, followed by the results. The final section discusses the significance of the paper's findings for the direction of future research.

2. Theoretical Basis: Political Consumerism and Corporate Sociopolitical Activism

Through CSA, firms take a position on policy issues related to core political values (Briscoe and Gupta 2016; McDonnell 2016), on beliefs around equality, civil liberties, or traditionalism, which define the political ideology of individuals (Feldman 1988; Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010; Ashton et al. 2005). Therefore, when firms weight in these issues through CSA, they reveal their preferences along the conservative-liberal ideology spectrum (Chuang, Church, and Ophir 2011; Negro and Olzak 2019). Research on social identity (Ashforth et al., 1989) and affective polarization (Iyengar and Westwood 2015) shows that the signaling of political ideology offers value to individuals with similar values and inclines them support the organization (Bundy, Shropshire, and Buchholtz 2013; Bundy et al.2018), while triggering the desire of those with opposing views to discriminate against it (Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra and Westwood 2012).

As a result, consumers' purchase decisions can be influenced by moral considerations pertaining to companies' practices around sociopolitical issues such as environmental protection (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2015), labor standards (Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Sequeira 2015), and corporate political activities (Panagopoulos et al 2019). This consumer behavior is known as political consumerism (Keum et al. 2004; Stolle and Micheletti 2015). Boycotting (resisting purchase) is a punished-oriented strategy motivated by the perceived egregiousness of the company's practices when they challenge the values of consumers (Klein et al. 2002, 2004).

Boycotting (deliberate purchase) is a reward-oriented strategy for companies engaging in practices perceived as favoring tangible outcomes in line with ethical, moral, or political standards consistent with customers' views (Friedman 1996; Neilson 2010; Sen et al. 2001; Klein et al. 2004; Hoffmann and Hutter 2012). Ultimately, boycotting and boycott reflect consumers' value congruence between their purchase behavior and their political identity, ideology and overall preferences.

Therefore, firms that engage in CSA are likely to experience both boycotting and boycott responses as consumers seek to fulfill their own value congruence; that is, ideologically misaligned consumers will be triggered to boycott while ideologically aligned consumers will be motivated to boycott firms. While some research has examined consumers' boycotting/boycotting responses towards firms (Reed et al. 2012; Hydock et al 2020; Panagopoulos et al 2019), no study has explicitly formulated and tested consumer's boycotting/boycotting responses after CSA. Therefore, I generate baseline hypotheses for the paper:

H1a (baseline): Firms that take a sociopolitical stance are likely to experience boycotting responses from ideologically misaligned consumers.

H1b (baseline): Firms that take a sociopolitical stance are likely to experience boycott responses from ideologically aligned consumers.

However, individual boycotting and boycott responses are not the flip sides of the same coin. Specifically, political consumerism research shows there exists a negativity bias (Kam et al 2020.; Elliot 2006; Baumeister et al. 2001) as consumers have a stronger impetus to punish negatively evaluated firms than to reward positively evaluated ones (Endres and Panagopoulos 2017; Newman and Bartels 2011; Stolle et al. 2005). This negativity bias generates an asymmetry in the political consumerism responses by making it easier to trigger a consumer into boycotting than to motivate the consumer into boycott (Trudel and Cotte 2009; John and Klein 2003; Kam and

Deichert 2019). I argue that the boycotting threshold is met when consumers perceive the firm as willingly engaging in an egregious act, while boycotting requires an additional revealed commitment through actions that produce tangible outcomes for a specific cause. This discussion offers a critical part of the theoretical basis for the core hypotheses of the paper, which are developed in the next section.

3. Theoretical Framework: Consumers Screening Firms' CSA Engagement

While firms traditionally refrain from publicly communicating their sociopolitical values (Gaines-Ross 2017), various groups of stakeholders have increased their expectations and pressure on firms to engage in public polarizing debates (Chatterji and Toffel 2018). This new challenge of publicly communicating firms' sociopolitical preferences generates much uncertainties for the firm because consumers, whose behavior determines the tradeoffs of firms' declaring their sociopolitical positions, face much uncertainties in making their assessemnet of the firm: Consumer question firm's genuineness in CSA and care about the substantive impact of CSA activities [CITE or elaborate]. τ Thus consumers are keen on screening the behavior of firms to detect cues that can help them reduce such information asymmetry (Bergh et al. 2014; Spence 1974) and decide if the extent to which the CSA engagement calls for a buycotting/boycotting response. Next, I argue that the firm's type of CSA role (pioneer or follower), and the type of CSA actions (symbolic or substantive) provide the necessary information for consumers to assess the firm's agency in CSA and commitment to the sociopolitical cause, and therefore motivate their political consumerism response.

3.1. Boycotting and Type of CSA Role: Pioneer vs Follower

Boycotting is triggered by the perception that the firm is willingly engaging in a strikingly wrong and egregious act (Balabanis 2013; Hoffmann and Müller 2009; Klein et al., 2002, 2004)

that deviates from established practices and challenges dutiful citizenship norms (Copeland 2014). According to the neo-institutional theory, whether the firm plays a pioneer role or whether it plays a follower role in the adoption of contested practices is a critically captures the degree of agency for its actions (Maguire et al.2004; DiMaggio1988; Westphal and Zajac 2001).

Pioneering CSA signals strong agency in deviating from the traditional institutional logic which stipulated that firms should not participate in public debates (Lounsbury 2001, 2007; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Thornton and Ocasio 1999, 2008). Pioneers can therefore face negative sanctions, in the form of boycott, for violating the social consensus (Noelle-Neumann 1974, 1993; Meyer and Rowan 1977) in which firms are traditionally expected to conceal their sociopolitical values (Gaines-Ross 2017). That is, not only is firm seen as challenging the ideological preferences of the consumers who hold different ideological stances, but it is also seen as leveraging its resources to create new institutions or to change existing ones (Maguire et al.2004; DiMaggio1988) to protect the interest of certain stakeholders around the sociopolitical cause in detriment of the consumers who are ideologically misaligned with the firm.

By contrast, as contested practices diffuse and become adopted by a larger number of actors, these practices will become increasingly accepted to the point of being legitimized (Westphal and Zajac 2001). When a firm adopts a follower CSA role, it is less clear whether the firm genuinely supports the sociopolitical cause or if it joins the stance as a result of mounting stakeholder or industry-related institutional pressures (Marquis et al., 2007). If the firm shows no clear agency in leading CSA, then it cannot be attributed equal levels of accountability for deviating from the norm. As more firms speak out on a sociopolitical issue through CSA, the practice of engaging in CSA start to gain greater external legitimacy through the convergence in their behavior (Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997; Hoffman 1999). Therefore, as a firm takes a stand alongside its peers, the degree of egregiousness in the eyes of consumers holding misaligned

ideologies is diffused by the “acceptance” or “resignation” effect of the coalition. This indicates that the backlash to the CSA act is more likely to be dispersed as more firms join the stance, providing a “safety in numbers” (Bhagwat et al., 2020; Chatterji and Toffel 2018). As a result, the risk of a follower firm in CSA experiencing boycotting is lowered.

In sum, while the baseline expectation is that ideologically misaligned consumers tend to boycotting firms that take CSA actions, the motivation of boycotting an individual pioneer firm is greater than boycotting the individual firm that chooses to join collective actions in engaging in CSA. Therefore, I predict the intensity of the boycott will be greater when firms assume a pioneer CSA role compared to a follower CSA role.

H2: Ideologically misaligned consumers are more likely to engage in boycotting firms that take on a pioneer role, than those that take on a follower role, in demonstrating their sociopolitical stance.

3.2. Boycotting and Type of CSA Actions: Substantive vs Symbolic

Boycotting is primarily triggered when the values of organizations aligned with that of consumers’ *and* when there is revealed commitment of the organization towards a specific cause (Bundy, Shropshire, and Buchholtz 2013; Bundy et al. 2018). The latter condition is important because consumers are commonly skeptical of opportunistic acts undertaken by corporations (Morsing 2017; Deephouse, 1999; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Therefore the revealed commitment contributes to the credibility of their contribution to the sociopolitical cause. According to neo-institutional theory, the most salient features that determine a firm’s commitment to the cause is whether firms engage in *substantive* acts which require investment of intensive resources or whether firms only involve *symbolic* acts that require minimal resource commitment, such as verbal support for the cause (Connelly et al. 2011; Kim and McAlister 2011).

As firms increasingly face the pressure from one or multiple groups of stakeholders, particularly consumers, to enter the sociopolitical domain and take a public stance on their values (Hoppner and Vadakkepatt 2019; Barton et al. 2018; Edelman 2018; Larcker and Tayan 2018), there is a real concern over whether firms take these actions symbolically without taking any economic stake. Neo-institutional theory reveals that symbolic acts as an attempt to attempt to fulfill such stakeholders' demands for CSA without necessarily involving company in a process of change (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Examples of symbolic CSA without much resource commitment include communicating the firm's sociopolitical values through channels such as social media, news articles or marketing campaigns. An example would be brands using Twitter to post messages in support of LGBTQ rights under #PrideMonth hashtags but without contributing economic resources to advancing the cause.

Nonetheless, research shows that symbolic actions are not always positively rewarded (Westphal and Zajac, 1998; Walker and Wan2012), especially when consumers think companies do not "walk the talk" (Lyon and Montgomery 2015; McDonnell and King 2013). Symbolic CSA can be seen an aspirational talk and an opportunistic attempt to appear moral without paying economic costs (Wagner et al.2009; Bromley and Powell 2012) which makes the firm's commitment to the sociopolitical cause seen as less credible (Yoon et al.2006; Becker-Olsen et al.2006; Skarmeas and Leonidou 2013). Just as in the context of environmental practices this lack of credibility is labeled as "Greenwashing", in the case of CSA, inauthentic commitments to sociopolitical causes have been referred to as "woke washing" (Sobande 2019; Vredenburg et al. 2018). The way in which firms can overcome this scrutiny and signal their genuine commitment (Newman and Smith 2016) is through concrete, substantive actions.

By contrast, substantive CSA requires higher levels of resources and accountability (Kim and McAlister 2011) because they involve tangible and concrete actions pertaining a sociopolitical

cause. An example is Starbucks' pledge to hire refugees as a way to express its disapproval of the former Trump's administration immigration policies (Disis 2017). This action requires devoting economic resources (hiring people) and is more difficult to reverse; therefore, it signals greater levels of corporate commitment to the sociopolitical cause (Klein, Smith, and John 2004). Other more common types of substantive CSA acts involve signing public letters addressed towards policy makers with specific requests to attain a policy goal. An example of this case are the 145 companies requesting stricter gun control regulations to the Senate in 2019. These letters represent a common form of CSA (Bhagwat et al 2020), in which companies have to devote time and internal resources to develop the content of the petition and submit it to their target political stakeholders. Furthermore, these letters which contain specific petitions now publicly hold the companies accountable to their content.

Therefore, screening whether the type of CSA actions undertaken by firms is likely to be symbolic or substantive is a powerful tool for consumers to assess the firm's commitment to the sociopolitical cause with. Recall that boycotting is more likely to occur when consumers are convinced of the revealed commitment of a firm to the socio-politically cause that they support. Therefore, it is more likely for a firm to experience boycotting if they engage in substantive CSA actions, which is seen as making greater commitment to the socio-political by ideologically aligned consumers, than if firms engage in symbolic CSA actions.

H3: Ideologically aligned consumers are more likely to engage in boycotting firms that commit to substantive actions, than symbolic actions, in demonstrating their sociopolitical stance.

3.3 Relative importance of pioneering role and substantive actions for boycotting and boycotting

Can firms' agency in CSA (revealed by taking pioneer vs follower roles), while affecting the boycotting of ideologically-misaligned consumers, also shape the boycotting of ideologically-aligned consumers? Recall that boycotting is triggered when the firm is perceived as willingly engaging in a strikingly wrong act. Because the pioneering role, as opposed to follower role, indicates a greater degree of agency in the willingness to challenge the customer preferences, it provides the necessary information to affect the boycotting decision of ideologically-misaligned consumers. However, I argue that this is not sufficient to trigger boycotting. Ideologically aligned consumers are primarily motivated towards boycotting by the additional revealed commitment of the organization to really advance the sociopolitical cause, as they commonly skeptical of opportunistic acts and cheap talk. Recall that the way boycotting consumers perceive this commitment is through resource intensive CSA actions, namely, substantive acts. Even if the firm is perceived as willingly engaging in CSA via assuming pioneer rather than follower role, this is not "enough" to persuade ideologically-aligned consumers to boycott the firm because this willingness itself does not necessarily entail committing real resources to advance the cause. In other words, the firms' perceived agency is relatively less influential in the decision to boycott compared to firms' actual commitment.

To sum up, knowing a firm is willingly engaging in CSA is not as valued for ideologically aligned consumers as knowing the firm is committed to contribute to the sociopolitical cause through resource-intensive actions. Therefore, when firms devote substantive resources that would materially advance the sociopolitical cause, it matters less to ideologically aligned consumers who consider using boycotting to reward firms whether firms did so out of their own volition or simply by copying others. As a result, while moderating the likelihood of boycotting, taking pioneering or

follower roles, is less important in affecting the likelihood of the boycotting by ideologically-aligned consumers.

H4a: The difference in the boycotting response of ideologically aligned consumers will be greater for firms that commit to substantive actions vis symbolic actions, compared to the difference between pioneer vis follower roles.

Can firms' commitment to the sociopolitical cause (revealed by taking substantive vs symbolic actions), while affecting the boycotting response, also shape the boycotting response? Recall my previous argument that, merely knowing that a firm may truly agree with the sociopolitical cause that consumers are against (indicated by stronger signals of agency in engaging CSA) is sufficient to trigger their desire to discriminate against and punish the organization through boycotting. As long as consumers have sufficient information to judge that firms have true willingness to engage in CSA, even taking symbolic actions amke low commitment is sufficiently egregious to trigger a boycotting response. Therefore, for a firm to show it is committing resources to the political cause does not provide additional information for consumers to assess the willingness of the firm to engage in CSA, because the firm's agency provides sufficient information for consumers to determine it.

Therefore, whether consumers perceive the firm to be more committed to the sociopolitical cause through substantive acts, while affecting the motivation for boycotting, plays a less important role in affecting the likelihood to boycott. Therefore, this logic can be summarized in the last hypotheses:

H4b: The difference in the boycotting response of ideologically misaligned consumers will be greater for firms that commit to pioneer roles vs follower, compared to the difference between symbolic vs follower roles.

4. Experimental Design

I adopt a novel survey experiment instrument (CITE) and implement a survey experiment on the online labor marketplace Prolific. Participants responded to a 10-minute survey in 24 Apr 2021 in which the experiment was embedded. Only U.S.-based participants were eligible to participate. The study examines the causal effect of a firm taking a progressive stance on a social-political issue on the subjects' willingness to boycott or buycott the firm, based on the subjects' own policy preferences. Instead of asking subjects about their willingness to boycott or buycott. I use a novel survey method to increase subjects' own economic stake in choosing one behavior or the other, The questions and information provided to subjects in the survey experiment refer to real-life events where existing firms either chose to take a progressive stand on the policy issues of the right to access abortion, stricter gun control regulations or transgender-inclusive restrooms.

4.1 Demographic Questions and Policy Issue Preferences

Subjects were asked about their gender, age, education, political ideology and times they watched the news per week. Then they were then randomly assigned to one of three socio-political policy issues: the right to access abortion, stricter gun control regulations, or supporting transgender-inclusive restrooms. Based on this assignment, they answered with a 5-point Likert scale (5= Strongly Agree) to one of the following questions, respectively, to gauge their own positions on those issues,: a) *“Do you think access to abortion should be banned or have significantly stricter regulations (i.e. only allowing abortion in very extreme cases such as when the mother's life is at risk)?”*; b) *“Do you think gun control regulations should be stricter?”* ; c) *“Do you think people should only be allowed to use public restrooms consistent with one's biological sex at birth, regardless of one's gender identity?”*. Whichever randomly assigned policy issue was presented was then combined with a randomly assigned treatment condition in the following section. For example, if subjects were asked about their opinion on the issue of

abortion, subjects were then exposed to a randomly assigned treatment condition referring to on firms linked to the issue of abortion rights.

4.2 Manipulations and Treatment Conditions

The experimental design had a total of 15 conditions (3 policy issues by 5 treatment groups, including the control group). For the treatment, subjects were asked to choose which given firm took a progressive stance on a policy issue (i.e. either the right to access abortion, to have stricter gun control regulations or have transgender-inclusive restrooms). Subjects had two firms to choose from as an answer (Firm A and Firm B). Depending on the issue, the Firm A/Firm B had different company names. Subjects assigned to the policy issue “right to access abortion” were given the pair MAC Cosmetics (Firm A) and Sephora (Firm B) as options. Subjects assigned to the issue of “stricter gun control regulations” were shown REI (Firm A) and Dicks Sporting Goods (Firm B) as options. For the policy issue of “transgender-inclusive restrooms”, subjects had to answer by choosing between GAP (Firm A) or Abercrombie & Fitch (Firm B).

After their selection, the correct answer was displayed, therefore informing subjects about which firm was the one that actually took a progressive stance and how. Firm A was systematically the correct answer, as it was the activist firm that indeed took a progressive stance on the policy issue in reality. Firm B was systematically a nonactivist firm from the same industry as Firm A. This means that Firm B in real life is a company that has not engaged, till the date of the experiment, in the policy issue displayed to the subjects. The design primes subjects to learn about Firm A being an activist progressive firm, where no other information is given about Firm B.

There were four treatment conditions where the type of information displayed about how the firm engaged in CSA was randomly varied across the dimensions of interest. For the type of CSA role, firms were presented as either being the first to engage in CSA (pioneer role) or joining a collective of firms that had already taken the stance (follower CSA). For type of CSA actions,

the firm was presented taking a public stance supporting a cause (symbolic action), and as contacting legislators through targeted advocacy letters (substantive action). Once again, these treatment condition reflect the actual way in which the corresponding firms engaged in CSA for each policy issue in real life. The treatment conditions include the following:

- a. *Pioneer Symbolic*: the firm was one of the first to take a progressive stance supporting a on the policy issue.
- b. *Pioneer Substantive*: the firm was one of the first to take a progressive stance supporting a on the policy issue and acting on the petition by sending a public letter to legislators advocating for that cause.
- c. *Follower Symbolic*: the firm joined many other firms in take the progressive stance on the policy issue.
- d. *Follower Substantive*: the firm joined many other firms in taking a progressive stance and acting by sending a joint letter to letter to legislators advocating for that cause.

Table 1. Summary of Treatment Conditions as Displayed to Subjects

Policy Issues				
A. Rights To Access Abortion (MAC Cosmetics vs Sephora)	B. Stricter Gun Control Regulations (REI vs Dick’s Sporting Goods)		C. Transgender-Inclusive Restroom Policies (GAP vs Abercrombie & Fitch)	
Treatment Conditions				
1. Pioneer.Symbolic	2. Follower.Symbolic	3. Pioneer.Substantive	4. Follower.Substantive	5. Control
Which company was one of the first to publicly support [*policy issue] when most companies were silent?	Which company joined many other firms in publicly supporting [*policy issue]?	Which company has one of the first to support [*policy issue] and signed an official letter to legislators advocating for [*policy issue]?	Which company joined many other firms in publicly supporting [*policy issue] and joined in signing an official letter to legislators advocating for [*policy issue]?	Which company [has blue in its logo/has dots in its logo / has a pine tree in its logo]?

4.3 Attitudinal Measures: Questions About Firms

After being exposed to the treatment conditions, the subjects completed a survey about their attitudes towards the previously given Firm A and Firm B, and were asked to self-select into one of two gift card raffles. Subjects answered a series of questions, as indicated below, about each of the firms presented in the treatment conditions (MAC Cosmetics and Sephora; GAP and Abercrombie and Fitch; REI and Dick's Sporting Goods). For each firm in the given pair, subjects were asked whether they had a good opinion about the firm, if they were willing to invest in it, how likely were they to buy in the following week, and if they supported the firm's response to the socio-political issue. Responses were collected on a 3-point Likert scale with *Agree*, *Neutral* and *Disagree*.

4.4 Behavioral Measures: Choice of Gift Card for Raffle

Researchers have documented a gap between the expression of political consumerism and actual behaviors (Boulstridge and Carrigan 2000; Ulrich and Sarasin 1995). Because of this concern, the last section of the survey entails a novel approach of using real monetary stakes to test if subjects are willing to boycott or buycott a firm after being exposed to the treatment conditions.

Subjects were asked to choose one of two gift card raffles to recognize the participation in the survey. The pair of gift cards presented corresponded to the respective firms presented in the multiple-choice answers during the treatment conditions (MAC Cosmetics vs Sephora; GAP vs Abercrombie and Fitch; REI vs Dick's Sporting Goods). Each gift card had attached a different dollar amount (\$30 or \$50). Subjects were presented a specific firm-credit gift card combination depending on their self-disclosed policy preference on the issues of abortion rights, gun control restrictions or transgender-inclusive restrooms.

Subjects were grouped into the category of “Liberal Subjects” if they strongly agreed or agreed with full access to abortion rights, with stricter gun control regulations, or with having transgender-inclusive restroom policies, based on their answers to earlier questions. Subjects were grouped into to the category “Conservative Subjects” if they were strongly against or against full access to abortion rights, stricter gun control regulations, or having transgender-inclusive restroom policies. For liberal subjects, they are offered to enter a raffle for a smaller amount gift card (\$30) for firms that took a progressive socio-political stance (Firm A) or to enter a raffle for a larger-amount gift card (\$50) for the nonactivist (Firm B). For conservative subjects, the offering reverses: They can choose a raffle for a larger-amount gift card (\$50) for the firms that took a progressive socio-political stance (Firm A) or a raffle for a smaller-amount gift card (\$30) for the nonactivist firm (Firm B)

This firm-credit pair design allows to identify boycotting and buycotting practices. Subjects that choose the gift card of smaller value reveals a purchase behavior consistent with their policy preferences, as either rewarding or punishing a firm entails real monetary stakes and costs for the subjects themselves.

5. Measures and Analysis

a. *Dependent Variables.* The main dependent variables are *Boycotting* and *Buycotting*. Both these variables are dichotomous. Boycotting is coded as 1 if at the end of the survey subjects with conservative preferences choose to participate in the gift card raffle of smaller value (\$30, i.e., that of the nonactivst firm), foregoing the gift card with higher value (\$50, i.t., that ofthe progressive firm). Buycotting is coded as 1 if at the end of the survey subjects with progressive preferences choose to participate in the \$30 gift card raffle (i.e., from the progressive firm), foregoing the gift card with higher value (\$50, i.e., that of the conservative firm). The third dependent variable of interest is attitudinal, which is the subjects’ *Good Opinion About the Firm*,

measured on a 3-point agreement Likert scale, where 1 indicates “Disagree” 2 “Neither Agree nor Disagree”, and 3 “Agree” for the statement “I have a good opinion about this firm”.

b. *Independent Variables:* The political stance manipulations are binary variables that equal to 1 if subjects were assigned to the named condition and 0 otherwise. The indicator variables for the treatment conditions are *Pioneer Substantive*, *Pioneer Symbolic*, *Follower Symbolic*, *Follower Substantive*, and *Control*. These treatment conditions are further collapsed into the two independent factor variables named *Type of CSA Role* (follower treatment, pioneer treatment, or control group) and *Type of CSA Action* (substantive treatment, symbolic treatment, or control group). Lastly, I categorize subjects as being aligned or misaligned with the firms’ sociopolitical stance based on their self-reported preferences about gender-neutral bathrooms, access to abortion rights and gun control regulations.

c. *Other variables and controls:* The regressions include control variables that could potentially influence the respondents’ willingness to boycott and opinion about the firms disclosed in the treatment conditions. These variables include gender, age range, political ideology, level of education, how many times per week they follow the news, if subject agrees with firms taking sociopolitical stands on issues unrelated to their business activity, and if the subject agrees with firms taking ... policy issue. All of these are coded as dummy variables. Gender is coded as *Male*, *Female* or *Other*. Age range is coded as *18-30*, *31-40*, *41-50*, *51+*. Political ideology is coded as *Liberal*, *Conservative*, and *Independent*. Levels of education include *Primary*, *Secondary*, *Undergraduate*, *Graduate* or *Post-Graduate*. Frequency of following news per week is coded as *Less than once per week*, *Between one and four times a week*, and *More than four times a week*. Opinion on firms taking sociopolitical stands is coded as *Agree*, *Disagree*, and *Neutral*. The policy issues are *abortion rights*, *gun control*, *transgender restrooms*.

6. Results

I aim at testing the effect of a firm taking a progressive stance on a polarizing policy issue, on the subjects' attitudes towards the firm and the boycotting/boycotting response through a gift card choice. The first set of results (Table 1 and Fig 2) demonstrates the overall treatment effect of CSA on political consumerism, while the rest of the section focuses on more fine-grained treatment conditions of *Pioneer-Symbolic*, *Pioneer-Substantive*, *Follower-Symbolic*, and *Follower-Substantive*, in comparison with the control group. Recall that in these treatments, the firm consistently takes a progressive stance on a sociopolitical issue but the way in which the firm takes the stance varies. Subjects are grouped as conservatives or liberals depending on their own policy preferences. The control condition is the suppressed reference group in the OLS and Logit models.

Overall Effect of CSA

Table 1 shows that the aggregated effect of the treatment, is statistically significant on subjects' good opinion about that firm. Specifically, for liberal subjects, a treatment of learning Firm A takes a progressive stand on a given issue significantly increases the likelihood of having a good opinion about the firm, compared to their control condition. Conversely, for conservative subjects treatment of learning Firm A takes a progressive stand on a given issue significantly decreases the likelihood of having a good opinion about Firm A, compared to their control condition. More precisely, receiving a treatment with information about a firm taking a progressive stance has a significantly (χ^2 test, $p < 0.01$) effect in nearly doubling the odds of liberal subjects' likelihood of developing a good opinion about Firm A, while conservative subjects have less than half the odds of developing a good opinion.

Figure 2 shows the proportion of subjects that chose to boycott and boycott the progressive firm after receiving a treatment. Based on the gift card choice, 61% of liberal subjects boycotted


the firm after learning it took a progressive stance, compared to the 37% of their control group. For conservative subjects, 46% boycotted the firm after learning it took a progressive stance, compared to the 24% in their control group. The differences in means tests between conservative and liberal subjects with their respective control group is statistically significant, demonstrating the existence of an overall a treatment effect. Therefore, I include that consistent with the first hypothesis, firms' CSA has an effect on the attitudes and political consumerism responses of subjects based on their ideological alignment or misalignment with the firm.

Table 1. Ordered Logistic Regression: Effect of Treatments on the Subjects' Positive Opinion About the Company That Took A Progressive Stance

	Conservative Subjects DV: Good Opinion (1)	Progressive Subjects DV: Good Opinion (2)
Treated Progressive Stance	-0.80*** (0.11)	0.56*** (0.09)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,195	2,911
$\chi^2 < p$.00	.00

Note: Ordered logic coefficients with standard errors below. Reference category for each subject group is their respective control group. DV Good Opinion: measured on a 3-point Likert Scale (3 = agree to have a good opinion about the company). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Fig 2. Mean Boycott and Buycott Response, Based on Subject's Ideology



Type of CSA Role: Pioneer vs Follower: The following results examine whether conservative subjects misaligned with a firms' progressive stance, are less likely to boycott when the firm's type of CSA role is that of a follower rather than a pioneer leasing the CSA engagement. Figure 3 shows the difference in means for boycott responses comparing treatment groups with these attributes, and table 2 reports the difference in means test is statistically significant. Therefore, this provides support for the second hypothesis.

Fig 3. Conservative Subjects: Mean Boycotting for Follower Treatment and Pioneer Treatments




Table 2. Conservative Subjects: Difference in Means Test for Boycotting Follower Treatment and Pioneer Treatment

Mean Boycotting: Follower Treatment	Mean Boycotting: Pioneer Treatment	Difference in Means
0.35 (0.48)	0.54 (0.50)	p<0.01***

Note: Standard deviation reported in parentheses. Independent sample t-tests: P-value of the null that the difference of means between the treatments group equals 0 (*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01). DV *Boycotting*: Dichotomous.

Type of CSA Action: Substantive vs Symbolic

The following results examine whether subjects aligned with a firms’ progressive stance, are more likely to engage in boycotting when the type of CSA engagement is substantive rather than symbolic. Figure 4 shows the level of boycott of liberal subjects for each treatment group. Table 4 shows the difference in means test for boycotting responses based on the *Type of CSA Role* (pioneer/follower) based on the treatment characteristics. Contrary to hypothesis 3, there is no difference in the level of boycotting based on substantive or symbolic treatments. There is no evidence for greater reward (boycotting) amongst subjects where the firm engaged in substantive CSA (by writing advocacy letters to legislators) whether its role was that of a pioneer or a follower. All treatment groups show a statistically significant boycott response compared to the control group, with no difference in the mean value of boycotting amongst the treatments. Therefore, there is no evidence to support the third hypothesis.

Fig 4. Liberal Subjects: Mean Buycotting Per Symbolic and Substantive Treatment Group




Table 3. Liberal Subjects: Difference in Means Test for Buycotting Substantive Treatment and Symbolic Treatment

Mean Buycotting: Symbolic Treatment	Mean Buycotting: Substantive Treatment	Difference in Means
0.62 (0.49)	0.61 (0.49)	p<0.99

Note: Standard deviation reported in parentheses. Independent sample t-tests: P-value of the null that the difference of means between the treatments group equals 0 (*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01). *DV Buycotting*: Dicotomous.

In order to clarify the underlying mechanisms that explain why consumers were highly motivated to buycott, regardless of the treatment conditions, 10 buycotting consumers were interviewed, recruited based on their response ID to the survey experiment. Participants were asked follow-up questions regarding their reasoning behind boycotting a progressive firm under different circumstances. The majority of subjects agreed that a firm joining other companies shows a very

little level of commitment to the particular cause, and that taking concrete actions is better than simply voicing a support for a sociopolitical issue.

However, because CSA is still uncommon, being the first firm to break the silence regarding a sociopolitical issue is seen as a brave act that deserves recognition, even if there is no substantive action. Furthermore, writing letters to legislators is perceived as the minimum a firm can do to advocate for a cause, given corporations have great resources. Overall, subjects agree they would boycott any firm for taking a progressive CSA stance because it is more important to provide visibility for an issue, regardless of its true intentions by engaging in CSA or the resources it provides. The findings in this section indicate that the threshold to boycott is not, after all, lower than to boycott when it comes to CSA.

Relative Weight of Type of CSA Role and Type of CSA Action: Lastly, I examine the effect of the interaction of the type of CSA role and type of CSA action in explaining boycott and buycott responses. According to the theory, the type of CSA role is sufficient to trigger a boycott response while the type of CSA action is the dimension predicts a buycott response. Table 4 shows that the difference in means between the treatment groups for misaligned consumers, providing support for hypothesis 4a, as all the pioneer CSA role display greater boycott regardless of the type of CSA action. Table 5 shows that the difference in means between the treatment groups for aligned consumers, providing no support for hypothesis 4b, as the substantive CSA action displays no greater buycott than the of the symbolic CSA or type of CSA role.

Table 4. Conservative Subjects: Difference in Means for Boycotting Responses Per Treatments

	Mean Boycotting (1)	Diff. Means: Pion.Symb. (2)	Diff. Mean: Pion.Subst. (3)	Diff. Mean: Folwr.Symb (4)
Pioneer Symbolic	0.57 (0.49)			
Pioneer Substantive	0.52 (0.50)	$p < 0.01^{***}$		
Follower Symbolic	0.32 (0.47)	$p < 0.001^{***}$	$p < 0.01^{***}$	
Follower Substantive	0.39 (0.49)	$p < 0.01^{***}$	$p < 0.01^{***}$	$p < 0.03^{**}$
Control Group	0.24 (0.43)	$p < 0.01^{***}$	$p < 0.01^{***}$	$p < 0.01^{***}$

Note: Difference in means t-test. Mean boycotting in each row's mean boycotting is compared to each column's group mean boycott. (* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$). *DV Boycotting*: Dicotomous.

Table 5. Liberal Subjects: Difference in Means for Buycotting Responses Per Treatment Group

	Mean Buycotting (1)	Diff. Means: Pion. Symbolic (2)	Diff. Means: Pion. Substantive (3)	Diff Mean: Folwr. Symbolic (4)
Pioneer Symbolic	0.61 (0.49)			
Pioneer Substantive	0.63 (0.48)	$p < 0.44$		
Follower Symbolic	0.59 (0.49)	$p < 0.64$	$p < 0.22$	
Follower Substantive	0.63 (0.48)	$p < 0.57$	$p < 0.18$	$p < 0.93$
Control Group	0.37 (0.48)	$p < 0.01^{***}$	$p < 0.01^{***}$	$p < 0.01^{***}$

Note: Difference in means t-test. Mean buycotting in each row's treatment group is compared to each column's mean treatment group buycotting. (* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$). *DV Buycotting*: Dicotomous.

Lastly Figure 5 and Table 6 show the mean boycott and buycott for the treatment groups and the difference in means test. Results show that liberal (aligned) consumers buycott at higher levels than misaligned consumers boycott. The only exception is the pioneer symbolic, where boycotting and buycott levels are comparable. Therefore, it can be concluded that liberal consumers are highly motivated to buycott firms that take progressive CSA stances, compared to the boycott response of conservative subjects.

Fig 5. Mean Boycotting and Buycottin Per Treatment Group




Table 6. Difference in Means for Boycotting and Buycotting Responses Per Treatment Group

Treatment Group	Conservatives Subjects: Mean Boycotting	Liberal Subjects: Mean Buycotting	Difference In Means
Pioneer.Symbolic	0.57 (0.50)	0.61 (0.49)	p=0.15
Pioneer.Substantive	0.52 (0.50)	0.59 (0.50)	p<0.03**
Follower.Symbolic	0.32 (0.47)	0.63 (0.48)	p<0.01***
Follower.Substantive	0.39 (0.47)	0.63 (0.48)	p<0.01***
Control	0.24 (0.42)	0.37 (0.48)	p<0.01***

Note: Standard deviation reported in parentheses. Independent sample t-tests: P-value of the null that the difference of means between the treatments group equals 0 (*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01). DV Buycotting: Dicotomous. DV Boycotting: Dicotomous.

7. Conclusion

Corporate sociopolitical activism is becoming an increasingly common phenomena amongst firms (Chatterji and Toffel 2019; Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño 2013; McDonnell 2016, Briscoe and Gupta 2016; McDonnell 2016). However, there is little empirical work on how the different ways in which firms engage in sociopolitical actions might impact consumer behavior. Some recent experimental research has shown consumers are likely to boycott and boycott when they learn about the campaign contributions of different firms (Panagopoulos and Costas 2020). The question is if this behavior extends to all forms of political behavior to the firm, including corporate sociopolitical activism.

This study examines the causal effect of consumers learning about a firm engaging in a progressive CSA stance on their decision to boycott or boycott such firm, by implementing a survey experiment with 5,106 US citizens through the online marketplace Prolific. The treatment conditions were designed along two key dimensions to examine how firms communicate their commitment to a sociopolitical cause: Type of CSA Role (pioneer vs follower) and Type of CSA Action (symbolic vs substantive).

Three key findings stem from this research. First, CSA does elicit a political consumerism response, with higher levels of boycott compared to boycott, regardless of the firm's role and actions. Second, boycott is higher when the firm takes on a pioneer role in promoting for the first time a CSA cause when the rest of the companies remain largely silent to the topic. Third, regardless of the role the company takes or the type of actions it implements, liberal respondents systematically boycott the firm. Therefore, contrary to conventional wisdom in political consumerism literature, the threshold to boycott is lower than to boycott when it comes to CSA.

In-depth interviews the logic behind liberal consumers decision to boycott the firm, regardless of its role and actions. Most importantly, liberal participants expressed that a simple public stance already provides enough attention and visibility to the sociopolitical issue at hand.

Therefore, even though it is preferable to engage in substantive actions, symbolic stances are still valuable. Furthermore, liberal subjects did not perceive that firms directly contacting legislators advocating for a sociopolitical cause were engaging in a substantive action. Such advocacy action is perceived as equally as influential for the sociopolitical issue as a firm simply taking a public stance in the media.

Finally, this study provides clear policy implications for practitioners in the way they can implement CSA engagement strategies eliciting greater stakeholder support and minimize backlash. Given the firm is predicted to receive greater boycott responses compared to boycott, even by engaging in symbolic actions just as a public stance, firms are encouraged to express their progressive views. Furthermore, since when the firm is portrayed to follow other companies in joining the same CSA stance the boycott response is lower, firms that wish to engage in CSA are encouraged to monitor sociopolitical issues that other companies are already talking about and consider joining the stance.

Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of the behavioral consequences of CSA for the firms' stakeholders. Future research should further examine the mechanisms that explain consumer responses to a firm's actions and identify ways in which firms can choose how to strategically engage in CSA in a way that increases the positive attitudes towards the firm, while reducing the backlash.

References

- Ashton, M. C., Danso, H. A., Maio, G. R., Esses, V. M., Bond, M. H., and Keung, D. K. Y. (2005, January). Two dimensions of political attitudes and their individual difference correlates: A cross-cultural perspective. In *Culture and social behavior: The Ontario symposium* (Vol. 10, pp. 1-29). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Baek, Y. M. (2010). To buy or not to buy: Who are political consumers? What do they think and how do they participate?. *Political Studies*, 58(5), 1065-1086.
- Balmer, J. M., and Gray, E. R. (2001). Corporate brands: what are they? What of them?. *European journal of marketing*. 37(7/8):972-997
- Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. *Journal of management*, 17(1), 99-120.
- Brooks, D. J., and Geer, J. G. (2007). Beyond negativity: The effects of incivility on the electorate. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1), 1-16.
- Carpenter, D. P., and Krause, G. A. (2012). Reputation and public administration. *Public administration review*, 72(1)26-32.
- Copeland, L. (2014). Value change and political action: Postmaterialism, political consumerism, and political participation. *American Politics Research*, 42(2)257-282.
- Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014). Reputation and status as motives for war. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17(1), 371–393.
- Dierickx, I., & Cool, K. (1989). Asset Stock Accumulation and the Sustainability of Competitive Advantage: Reply. *Management Science*, 35(12), 1514–1514.
- Dutton, J. E., Dukerich, J. M., and Harquail, C. V. (1994). Organizational images and member identification. *Administrative science quarterly*239-263.
- Endres, K., and Panagopoulos, C. (2017). Boycotts, buycotts, and political consumerism in America. *Research and Politics*, 4(4)2053168017738632.
- Friedman, M. (1996). A positive approach to organized consumer action: The “buycott” as an alternative to the boycott. *Journal of Consumer Policy*, 19(4), 439-451.
- Gardberg, N. A., and Fombrun, C. J. (2006). Corporate citizenship: Creating intangible assets across institutional environments. *Academy of management Review*, 31(2), 329-346.
- Hainmueller, J., Hiscox, M. J., and Sequeira, S. (2015). Consumer demand for fair trade: Evidence from a multistore field experiment. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 97(2)242-256.
- Hoffmann, S., and Müller, S. (2009). Consumer boycotts due to factory relocation. *Journal of Business Research*, 62(2)239-247.
- Huber, G. A., and Malhotra, N. (2017). Political homophily in social relationships: Evidence from online dating behavior. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(1)269-283.
- Hunter, J. D. (1992). *Culture wars: The struggle to control the family, art, education, law, and politics in America*. Avalon Publishing.

- Hutter, K., and Hoffmann, S. (2013). Carrotmob and anti-consumption: Same motives but different willingness to make sacrifices?. *Journal of Macromarketing*, 33(3)217-231.
- Iyengar, S., and Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(3), 690-707.
- Iyengar, S., Sood, G., and Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology a social identity perspective on polarization. *Public opinion quarterly*, 76(3), 405-431.
- Johnston, C. D., Lavine, H. G., and Federico, C. M. (2017). *Open versus closed: Personality, identity, and the politics of redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kam, C. D., and Deichert, M. (2020). Boycotting, buycotting, and the psychology of political consumerism. *The Journal of Politics*, 82(1), 71-88
- Khan, R., Misra, K., and Singh, V. (2013). Ideology and brand consumption. *Psychological science* 24(3), 326-333.
- Klein, J. G., Smith, N. C., and John, A. (2004). Why we boycott: Consumer motivations for boycott participation. *Journal of Marketing*, 68(3), 92-109.
- Leege, D. C., Wald, K. D., Krueger, B. S., and Mueller, P. D. (2002). The Politics of Cultural Differences: Social Change and Voter Mobilization Strategies in the Post-New Deal Period.
- Levendusky, M. (2009). *The partisan sort: How liberals became Democrats and conservatives became Republicans*. University of Chicago Press.
- McCann, J. A. (1997). Electoral choices and core value change: The 1992 presidential campaign. *American Journal of Political Science*, 564-583.
- McConnell, C., Margalit, Y., Malhotra, N., and Levendusky, M. (2018). The economic consequences of partisanship in a polarized era. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1), 5-18.
- Neilson, L. A. (2010). Boycott or buycott? Understanding political consumerism. *Journal of Consumer Behaviour*, 9(3)214-227.
- Neilson, L. A., and Paxton, P. (2010). Social capital and political consumerism: A multilevel analysis. *Social Problems*, 57(1), 5-24.
- Newman, B. J., and Bartels, B. L. (2011). Politics at the checkout line: Explaining political consumerism in the United States. *Political Research Quarterly*, 64(4), 803-817.
- O'Brian, N. A. (2019). One-Party States and Legislator Extremism in the US House, 1876–2012. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(4), 1223-1239.
- Panagopoulos, Costas, et al. (2020): Partisan Consumerism: Experimental Tests of Consumer Reactions to Corporate Political Activity. *The Journal of Politics* 82.3 996-1007.
- Peeters, G., and Czapinski, J. (1990). Positive-negative asymmetry in evaluations: The distinction between affective and informational negativity effects. *European review of social psychology*, 1(1), 33-60.
- Roccas, S., and Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social identity complexity. *Personality and social psychology review*, 6(2), 88-106.

- Stolle, D., Hooghe, M., and Micheletti, M. (2005). Politics in the supermarket: Political consumerism as a form of political participation. *International political science review* 26(3)245-269.
- Schwartz, S. H., Caprara, G. V., and Vecchione, M. (2010). Basic personal values, core political values, and voting: A longitudinal analysis. *Political psychology*, 31(3), 421-452.
- Shaw, D., Hogg, G., Wilson, E., Shiu, E., and Hassan, L. (2006). Fashion victim: the impact of fair trade concerns on clothing choice. *Journal of Strategic Marketing*, 14(4), 427-440.
- Smith, N. C., and Cooper-Martin, E. (1997). Ethics and target marketing: The role of product harm and consumer vulnerability. *Journal of Marketing*, 61(3), 1-20.
- Watkins, L., Aitken, R., and Mather, D. (2016). Conscientious consumers: a relationship between moral foundations, political orientation and sustainable consumption. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 134, 137-146.
- Webster, S. W., and Abramowitz, A. I. (2017). The ideological foundations of affective polarization in the US electorate. *American Politics Research*, 45(4), 621-647.